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In this essay, we poke at several sacred cows (even though
we like their milk and drink it ourselves) and point out
several overlooked ordinary cows as well. We discuss our
little herd of claims in five sections.
Using trust in computing systems is
already common and should be pervasive
Trust—“reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of
a person or thing”1—is pervasive in social systems. We
constantly apply it in interactions between people, organi-
zations, animals, and even artifacts (“Can I trust my car on
this vacation trip?”). We use it instinctively and implicitly
in closed and static systems, or consciously and explicitly
in open or dynamic systems. An epitome for the former
case is a small village, where everybody knows everybody,
and the villagers instinctively use their knowledge or
stereotypes to trust or distrust their neighbors. A big city
exemplifies the latter case, where people use explicit rules
of behavior in diverse trust relationships. A city dweller
builds up trust, for instance, by asking friends or recommen-
dation services for a dependable plumber.
If trust is so pervasive and beneficial in complex social
systems, why not exploit pervasive trust as a paradigm in
computing environments? (Using pervasive trust in non-
pervasive computing is not a contradiction!) We already
use trust in computing systems extensively, although usu-
ally subconsciously. Examples are users’ trust-based deci-
sions to search for reputable ISPs or e-banking sites, or to
ignore emails from “Nigerians” asking for help transfer-
ring millions of dollars out of their country. The challenge
for exploiting trust in computing lies in extending the use
of trust-based solutions, first to artificial entities such as
software agents or subsystems, then to human users’ sub-
conscious choices.
Trust is a complex, multifaceted, and context-dependent
The Pudding of Trust
If you can spot one trend in intelligent systems, I think it would be
the issue of trust. I’ve seen many paper titles and recently some work-
shops that involve the term “trust.” At the same time, I’ve wondered
what kind of trust people want their computers to manage. Intuitively,
we all know that trust is important and precious, something we
might work hard to earn from others and might not assign gener-
ously when things really matter. But what is trust in computing?
The literature gives numerous answers: reputation, security con-
cerns, quality of data or services, credentials, risk management, and
many more.1 They all can play a role when dealing with trust. So,
when trying to define trust in computing, we end up with a pudding
of things rather than a solid definition.
To address this “pudding of trust” are this issue’s five complemen-
tary contributions. Bharat Bhargava, Leszek Lilien, Arnon Rosenthal,
and Marianne Winslett emphasize that rather different issues can
arise with trust. When building an application, you must find the
sweet spot where the trust infrastructure is neither so strong nor so
weak that it would jeopardize acceptance and scalability.
Morris Sloman focuses on trust issues in pervasive applications and
on the problem that arises with graded levels of trust. Tharam S. Dil-
lon, Elizabeth Chang, and Farookh Khadeer Hussain present a con-
crete approach for computing such graded trust levels.
Wolfgang Nejdl and Daniel Olmedilla consider the problem of pass-
ing credentials in peer-to-peer systems. In particular, they recommend
sharing credentials with third parties if trust negotiation strategies
allow this.
Finally, Vipul Kashyap considers the dimension of “trusting in
information,” which can be a slippery issue in a world where infor-
mation semantics aren’t fixed but remain a moving target.
So, this issue’s authors present a range of interesting thoughts
and recipes on how to think about trust and deal with it. Now, as
the proof of the pudding lies in the eating, enjoy!
—Steffen Staab
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Editor’s Perspective
notion. Therefore, words of caution are in
order. First, using the trust paradigm requires
that you carefully select all and only those
useful trust aspects needed for the system
you’re designing. Otherwise, either flexibil-
ity or performance will suffer.
Second, unwarranted demands for evi-
dence or credentials render trust-based inter-
actions laborious and uncomfortable, while
insufficient requirements brand them too lax.
(In the latter case, who wants to be friends
with someone who befriends crooks and
thieves?)
Third, excessive reliance on explicit trust
relationships hurts performance. For exam-
ple, modules in a well-integrated system
should rely on implicit trust, just as villagers
do. In a crowd of entities, only some com-
municate directly, and even fewer use trust
explicitly.
The report from a National Science Foun-
dation Information and Data Management
workshop session on trust, privacy, and
security raises many other issues in this
research area.2
You can trade privacy for trust,
but this requires privacy
guarantees
We define privacy as an entity’s ability
to control the availability and exposure of
information about itself. (Extending in this
definition the subject of privacy from a per-
son in the original definition3 to an entity—
including an organization or software—is
controversial, but stimulating.) Privacy and
trust are closely related. Entities can choose
to trade their privacy for a corresponding
gain in their partners’ trust. As in social
interactions, the scope of an entity’s privacy
disclosure should be proportional to the
benefits expected from the interaction. For
example, a customer applying for a mortgage
must reveal much more personal data than
someone buying a book.
Optimally, a party would give up only as
much privacy as is indispensable for gaining
the level of trust required for establishing a
desirable partnership. To facilitate finding
this optimum level, researchers need to pro-
pose privacy and trust measures, automate
the evaluation of the privacy loss and trust
gain, and quantify this trade-off.4
Any exchange of an entity’s private in-
formation for a gain in its partners’ trust
depends on satisfactory limits on its further
dissemination, such as a partner’s solid pri-
vacy policies. Merely perceiving the poten-
tial for a partner’s privacy violation makes
the other entity reluctant to enter into a part-
nership. A user who learns that an ISP has
carelessly revealed any customer’s email
will look for another ISP. So, the privacy-
for-trust trade requires privacy guarantees.
Socially based paradigms will
play a big role in pervasive-
computing environments
In pervasive computing environments,
people will be surrounded by zillions of
computing devices of all kinds, sizes, and
aptitudes.5 Most of them will have limited 
or even rudimentary capabilities and will be
quite small, such as radio frequency identi-
fication tags and smart dust. Most will be
embedded in artifacts for everyday use, or
even human bodies (with possibilities for both
beneficial and apocalyptic consequences).
Pervasive devices with inherent com-
munication capabilities might even self-
organize into huge, opportunistic sensor
networks, able to spy anywhere, anytime,
on everybody and everything within their
midst. (The definition of the term “oppor-
tunistic”—in accordance with our inten-
tions—suggests “often unethical” behavior.1)
Without proper means of detection and
neutralization, no one will be able to tell
which and how many snoops are active,
what data they collect, and who they work
for (an advertiser? a nosy neighbor? Big
Brother?). Questions such as “Can I trust
my refrigerator?” will not be jokes—the
refrigerator will be able to snitch on its
owner’s dietary misbehavior to the owner’s
doctor.
Will pervasive computing force us to
abandon all hope for privacy? Will a cyber-
fly, with high-resolution camera eyes and
supersensitive microphone ears, end privacy
as we know it? Should a cyberfly be too
clever to end up in the soup, the only hope
might be to develop cyberspiders. But
cyberbirds might eat those up. So, we’ll
build a cybercat. And so on and so forth …
Radically changed reality demands new
approaches to computer security and privacy.
Will a new privacy category appear—namely,
protecting artificial entities’ privacy? We
believe that socially based paradigms, such as
trust-based approaches, will play a big role in
pervasive computing. As in social settings,
solutions will vary from heavyweight ones
for entities of high intelligence and capabili-
ties (such as humans and intelligent systems)
interacting in complex and important mat-
ters, to lightweight ones for less intelligent
and capable entities interacting in simpler
matters of lesser consequence. 
Trust management has
emphasized logic, not IT 
Work to date focuses on providing a good
target policy language for reasoning, with 
a few excursions into knowledge capture.
These policy languages have been based on
mathematical logic—typically extensions of
Datalog that provide good reasoning power.
But using Datalog to describe real-world
security policies is like giving IT people a
Lego kit—flexible, but microlevel if used to
model the world.
Further complicating technology trans-
fer, the trust management (TM) community
uses various Datalog dialects, with exten-
sions to make them better suited to knowl-
edge capture. Logic has lost previous bat-
tles for mindshare in both the software and
database arenas. Although the research com-
munity explored Prolog and Datalog, indus-
try decided that abstraction, inheritance, and
composition features were more important
and went to objects. Will this happen again?
TM researchers should move beyond the
question of the best prototype they can build,
and be sensitive to the pragmatics of choos-
ing a language. The list of issues is long. Is
there a standard for the language, with pow-
erful supporters? What reasoning facilities
do users need, and what portion of the rea-
soning facilities must reside in the formal
system? If you provide a strictly flat rela-
tional reasoner (for example, Datalog), can
users draw conclusions about the complex
objects that interest them? Systems fre-
quently use structures more complex than
relations—even relational databases are mov-
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ing in that direction. Interfaces are moving to
XML. How can TM work leverage these
advances and produce a system that IT peo-
ple and even ordinary users could use to
write and maintain security-related policies?
If Tim Berners-Lee is right (and Sir Tim
has a good track record), much of the knowl-
edge that users are reasoning about will be
related in OWL—for example, BloodTest will
be known as a kind of MedicalTest. Perhaps
TM researchers should declare a moratorium
on Datalog dialects and focus on OWL. If
enhancements are needed for TM purposes,
should we add them to OWL?
Going beyond the formalisms, inserting
TM into the wider system presents major
challenges (see Rohit Khare and Adam
Rifkin’s First Monday article for a good
discussion of TM on the Web6). How do
you manage trust attributes’ semantics and
deal with policies that go far beyond the
traditional authentication-centered public-
key infrastructure and signed content? How
can we extend the TM framework to encom-
pass data quality metrics, data-cleansing
techniques, and assertions of all sorts in rea-
soning about trust?7 Secrecy-preserving
query techniques can help but might not pro-
vide sufficient flexibility, performance, and
ease of use—complete protection might be
infeasible. Thus, how can we transparently
insert trust and belief into query processing
as an additional criterion for optimization—
either as a constraint or as a quantitative
trade-off? Can we provide principles for
returning partial results? Across organiza-
tions, you can anticipate that terminologies,
data types, operations, groups, roles, and so
on will differ. Suppose someone has done the
usual “semantic integration” job and pro-
duced a set of concept mappings. What does
this tell us about how security policies should
map across organizations? 
A final major challenge is to provide the
technical basis for auditing privacy-relevant
behavior by corporations or government
agencies. (A nontechnical basis—laws plus
auditors who are trusted by both privacy advo-
cates and the organizations whose records
they will examine—will also be needed.)
Setting up a trust infrastructure (with
facilities for identity management, policy
evaluation, and trust establishment) is labori-
ous but relatively easy. A policy management
infrastructure is tougher, with its require-
ments for GUIs for composing, updating,
importing, versioning, protecting, and ana-
lyzing policies. Toughest of all, and the goal
of both infrastructures, is determining an
appropriate organizational policy and auto-
matically mapping that high-level policy to
suitable enforcement mechanisms and to
the semantic and security models that part-
ner organizations use.
Artificial and “from scratch”
application areas 
are for wimps
Fervor sometimes causes adherents to cap-
italize the name of an emerging application
area to prove that it is Something Incredi-
bly Important, as with the Semantic Web
and Grid Computing. In some cases, Capi-
talized Research Areas eventually became
real-world success stories. The World Wide
Web is an excellent example. But who today
runs real applications on real computational
grids, and who uses a real semantic web?
Hardly anyone, so far. And that, we argue,
is what makes today’s Capitalized Research
Application Areas so appealing to researchers,
including us—there aren’t real users to worry
about, there aren’t real applications to worry
about, and there are no reality checks. This
lack of reality lets our creative juices flow,
unchecked by legacy issues, feature inter-
actions (including working with features
designed by others), manageability require-
ments, precise semantics, and other pesky
real-world concerns. Yet, are there enough
researchers investigating the most pressing
real-world security problems, such as enter-
prise-wide and cross-enterprise information
systems? 
Now that we’ve questioned our own
research tastes, let’s address the obvious fol-
low-up question: What application areas in
TM do we recommend for those who want
to be considered “ironwomen” or “iron-
men”? At the top of our list are supply chain
management (SCM),8 customer relationship
management,9 and collaborative engineering
(for example, bid creation). Hundreds of
vendors compete in these billion-dollar mar-
ket areas, so these applications’ economic
importance is indisputable. Furthermore, all
three involve opening up systems so that peo-
ple outside a particular company can access
internal corporate services and resources.
For example, in an SCM system, the order
entry services, order status services, and
sales and production forecasts of WheelCorp
could become accessible to its supplier, Bear-
ings.com, and to WheelCorp’s customer,
CarsInc, as well as to Bearings.com’s own sup-
pliers and CarsInc’s own customers. Market
forces are driving the move to this kind of
cross-enterprise integration and are push-
ing companies to reorganize themselves
internally as virtual enterprises—that is,
enterprises in which the means of fulfilling
any particular business need can be switched
in an instant between different suppliers. 
As in any open system and virtual enter-
prise, trust is a central issue here. To aid in
establishing trust, organizations’ policies
describe who can do what under what cir-
cumstances, and these policies are central
to establishing trust in these applications.
What exciting application areas these are,
with their large but constantly evolving
installed software bases and the potential
for huge impact for successful research pro-
jects. Like other really hard applications,
the issues here involve clarifying confusing
situations and providing a migration path
for legacy systems without designing from
scratch.
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Trust Management in Internet
and Pervasive Systems
Morris Sloman, Imperial College London
Businesses, professionals, and scientists
will increasingly use the Internet to set up
virtual organizations to provide a service
or support collaboration. Examples include
combining the distributed databases and
processing services owned by different
organizations for an e-science application,
and the organizations that collaborate on
designing and manufacturing components
for automobiles or aerospace. For existing
collaborations, trust is based on many years’
experience, but setting up new collaborations
requires evaluating trust without the benefit
of face-to-face meetings, which provide
considerable but subtle information that lets
people assess mutual trust.
In future pervasive-computing applica-
tions, mobile devices will interact with each
other and with an intelligent infrastructure
to help people with normal activities. An
example is ubiquitous healthcare, which will
be able to monitor an individual’s chronic
illness, such as a heart condition, diabetes,
or epilepsy; determine abnormal events;
and notify the patient as well as medical or
emergency services as necessary. We’ll use
the intelligent environment for sensing
context and providing additional processing
or storage services, as well as for remote
communication. Pervasive applications
might require dynamic ad hoc collaborations
as people move around and join or leave
them. Obvious implications exist when it
comes to trusting the intelligent environment,
particularly with respect to potentially sen-
sitive medical data. 
From these scenarios, you can see that
systems must be able to assess trust and
use this as the basis for automated decision
making—whether to use a service, whether
to permit access to resources in an ad hoc
collaboration or virtual organization, and
what type of security mechanisms (for exam-
ple, encryption or authentication) a person
should use when interacting with unknown
services or collaborators.
Trust components
We define trust as “the quantified belief
by a trustor with respect to the competence,
honesty, security, and dependability of a
trustee within a specified context.”1 Quan-
tification reflects that a trustor can have
various degrees of trust, which could be
expressed as a numerical range or as a sim-
ple semantic classification. Specifying actual
trust values can be difficult, so we often use
classes such as high, medium, and low. We
can use a numerical range to reflect uncer-
tainty in the assessment of the trust value—
for example, we might assign a large range
initially but, owing to the experience of inter-
acting with the trustee, we could reduce the
range to reflect increased certainty (con-
fidence) in the trust value.2
Trust is specified in a specific context.3
For example, a trustee might use resources
such as data the trustor owns, or provide a
specific service to the trustor such as med-
ical advice, processing, or authentication. A
trust level for one context doesn’t normally
apply to a different context, so you wouldn’t
trust a highly trusted medical advisor for
financial advice. The attributes of trust
depend on the trust context. Honesty and
truthfulness might be more important for
financial trust relationships, but competence
would be a key attribute for a medical advi-
sor. Dependability would encompass relia-
bility and timeliness, which could be impor-
tant for real-time applications. Security
would be a key attribute for a trusted med-
ical monitoring service. 
Distrust might be a useful concept to
indicate entities that you should avoid for
interaction purposes. A simple way to rep-
resent distrust is with negative trust values.
Generally, trust isn’t transitive. If B trusts
C, and A trusts B, this doesn’t imply that A
trusts C. However, A could delegate trust
decisions to B. For example, B could be an
authentication server or certification author-
ity. A will trust an entity that B trusts and
certifies, although A might not know the
basis of B’s trust. Another form of trust tran-
sitivity occurs when A uses a service B that
depends on another service C. A implicitly
trusts C but might not know that B depends
on C, and so might not know of this implicit
trust relationship.
When first encountering an unknown
entity, a trustor can rely on recommenda-
tions from other trusted entities. Recommen-
dation (used in electronic auction and peer-
to-peer systems4) differs from delegation in
that the delegatee actually makes the trust
decision for the trustor, but a trustor uses
recommendations as additional information
to make its own trust decision. Reputation
is usually based on a combination of rec-
ommendations and experience from many
different third-party sources. Various tech-
niques exist for combining recommenda-
tions: using simple averages, letting old
recommendations decay, weighting them
on the basis of the recommender’s trust lev-
els, and so on. 
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In future pervasive-computing
applications, mobile devices will
interact with each other and with
an intelligent infrastructure to help
people with normal activities.
Trust isn’t a static concept. It changes
over time owing to experience from the
outcome of interactions between the trustor
and trustee, or as a result of other entities’
experience interacting with the trustee and
modifying its reputation. 
Trust is also related to risk,5 where risk
is the probability of loss with respect to an
interaction—for example, nonpayment for a
service or a server failing and losing infor-
mation. We might use risk related to a con-
text to determine the level of trust, but we
must also consider the interaction’s value. I
might be prepared to trust a high-risk sup-
plier for a low-valued $10 CD purchase, but
I wouldn’t trust a medium-risk supplier for
a high-valued $20,000 car purchase. Some
systems, such as finance decision making,
use the risk value as the basis for decision
making. In this case, a trust value might be
an element in the risk valuation.
Trust management is collecting, codify-
ing, analyzing, and evaluating evidence
relating to competence, honesty, security,
or dependability with the purpose of mak-
ing assessments and decisions regarding
trust relationships. Trust management sys-
tems must support analysis of trust and rec-
ommendation specifications to detect con-
flicts and inconsistencies and support trust
queries related to decision making.1
Trust and recommendation
specifications
We need a precise specification of trust
and recommendation requirements so that
automated components can use this infor-
mation to make decisions.1 Thus,
trust ( Tr, Te, As, L ) ← Cs
states that a trustor Tr trusts or distrusts a
trustee Te to perform actions As at trust
range L if constraint Cs is true. As, the action
set, is a colon-delimited list of actions (which
effectively specify the context). An action,
such as storing information, could be per-
formed by the trustor on the trustee, or by
the trustee on the trustor. Actions might
have parameters (not shown earlier), the
first of which indicates whether the action
is performed on the trustor or trustee. L, the
range of trust levels, is expressed as integers
between 0 and 100. Negative values repre-
sent distrust. We can specify L as predefined
labels—for example, high trust is 90 to
100, low trust is 5 to 20, and a default ini-
tial trust range is 0 to 50. When the trust
management system evaluates a trust rela-
tionship, it only applies if the set of con-
straints Cs evaluates to true. Elements in
Cs can be combined by logical And (&)
and logical Or ( | ). For example, in
trust(AnalProg, StorageServer, 
StoreData(StorageServer), 80–100 )
← StorageServer.owner = CoXYZ & 
risk(StorageServerFail) < 0.1
the analysis program (AnalProg) trusts the
storage server for storing data when the
storage server is owned by CoXYZ and
risk of the server failing is less than 0.1.
(We assume risk has a value between 0
and 1.) The recommendation
recommend ( Rr, Re, As, L ) ← Cs
states that the recommender Rr recommends
the recommendee Re at recommendation
level L to perform As if constraint Cs is
true. As, the recommended action set, is a
colon-delimited set of actions defining a
context for the recommendation. L can be a
range of values and Cs a delimited set of
constraints, as in the trust rule. Negative
values for recommendations indicate that
the recommender doesn’t recommend the
recommendee. 
Note that we assume that the recommen-
dation and trust levels are independent of
each other. A high-level recommendation
could result in a low trust level. A trust rule
constraint could be based on a recommen-
dation, or a recommendation constraint




the AmbulanceSupervisor recommends letting
any paramedic that LondonAmbulance employs
join the emergency response team at an
accident.
Trust-based decisions
You can use the trust specification to
influence decisions in many ways. When
forming virtual organizations and ad hoc
dynamic communities, we must establish
trust between the various entities that will
constitute the virtual organization before
negotiating service level agreements or
contracts. A clear requirements specifica-
tion for this trust is needed in terms of trust
rules. This could be based on recommenda-
tions, assertions, or signed credentials from
third parties.6
You could refine trust specifications into
security policies. For example, if the trust
rules indicate that the network infrastruc-
ture isn’t secure, you’ll need a strong form
of encryption for all external communica-
tion, and you must use mutual authentica-
tion. An authorization policy can also
explicitly make access control decisions on
the basis of querying a trust level from a
trust management system. A Ponder autho-
rization policy7 specifies the actions that a
subject can perform on a target object when
an optional constraint is true. The follow-
ing Ponder authorization policy specifies
that only clients with high trust levels can
access a prerelease section of the music
content base. Access is denied if the policy
constraint, which queries the trust manage-
ment system to evaluate the trust level, deter-
mines it isn’t high.




when (trust (Client, AccessMusic) 
>=high }.
You could base recommendations on cur-
rent trust ratings for an entity either in the
same context or with respect to a different
context—that is, no trust rules exist for that
specific context. For example, Fred gets a
request for a recommendation of eTunes as
a video content supplier but only has a trust
rule related to music supply. Fred isn’t sure
about eTune’s ability to provide the data
rate needed for video, so he only gives a low
rating for a recommendation.
In ad hoc collaborations between mobile
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Trust management systems must
support analysis of trust and
recommendation specifications 
to detect conflicts and
inconsistencies and support trust
queries related to decision making.
entities, some of the members might not
have Internet access. Thus, it isn’t always
practical for an existing member to evalu-
ate a new member’s credentials by access-
ing the credential-issuing authority to obtain
its public keys. In such a situation, it might
be necessary to trust other members of the
collaboration to help with the validation.
For example, other members might actually
have the public key required to validate the
credential or might be able to recommend
the new entity on the basis of some other
information.6
Trust issues
Many unsolved trust issues exist in Inter-
net and pervasive applications.
A big problem in automating trust-based
decisions is evaluating a trust level or range.
Determining initial trust values can be quite
difficult, and the default values might be
rather arbitrary. Combining evidence related
to experience, recommendations, reputation,
and risk into a trust evaluation can be com-
plex and application dependent. In many
practical situations, there might not be any
past experience for a specific trustee or con-
text on which to base a trust evaluation. So,
the evaluation might have to depend on trust
evaluation from a different context. How to
do this isn’t obvious. A possibility exists for
collusion between agents to provide false
recommendations, so a need exists for trust
evaluation of recommenders,4 which can
lead to circular dependencies between trust
and recommendations. 
The privacy issue is a fundamental prob-
lem in pervasive systems, which inherently
track information such as activity, location,
and various other personal information. In
most cases, the pervasive infrastructure is
responsible for this tracking (as in cellular
phone systems). How can you trust the
organizations managing the infrastructure
to use this context information responsibly
and not pass it on to inappropriate third
parties?8 The same issue applies to any
organization trusted to monitor personal or
medical information.
Using anonymity or pseudonymity to
support privacy in pervasive systems has
trust implications as well. We must support
trust specifications and reasoning for anony-
mous entities, but this can cause problems
with respect to payment for services because
many payment systems depend on identities. 
In pervasive systems, users move around
and might be at home, at the office, in a
public building, or on the street. The level
of trust in the infrastructure or related to
personal-area networks belonging to peo-
ple in the vicinity will depend on the cur-
rent context—where you are, what you’re
doing, who’s in the vicinity, and so on.
Trust is thus context dependent and should
be considered when adapting security poli-
cies to the current context. For example,
when in a meeting, I might trust the atten-
dees to access services in my personal area
network, but when walking on the street,
passersby shouldn’t have any access. 
Setting up a virtual organization for 
e-commerce applications or to provide a
consolidated service from multiple service
suppliers requires negotiating contracts
based on trust. This could involve interac-
tions between composed or federated trust
domains. The contracts will form a basis
for policies relating to the entities’ rights
and duties within the virtual organization
and service level agreements for customers.
This must map to policies governing the
interactions, which must also adapt as trust
changes with experience, risk, or transac-
tion value. Automated techniques and tools
to support this don’t currently exist.
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Managing the Dynamic Nature
of Trust
Tharam S. Dillon, University of
Technology, Sydney
Elizabeth Chang and Farookh Khadeer
Hussain, Curtin University of Technology,
Australia
Trust has been an important element in
interpersonal relationships in many fields.
In computing, it’s only become really impor-
tant with the Internet’s widespread use. A
significant difference in the virtual world is
the absence of physical cues that form the
basis of trust in the physical world. Stephen
Marsh defined trust early for the distributed
artificial intelligence field.1 Recently, trust
issues have taken on more urgency owing
to four factors:
• Peer-to-peer (P2P) communication, pos-
sibly anonymous
• Virtual communities, which must protect
community integrity2
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We must support trust specifications
and reasoning for anonymous
entities, but this can cause
problems with respect to payment
for services because many payment
systems depend on identities.
• E-commerce
• Cyberterrorism, which aims to disrupt
services
Trust is sometimes used synonymously
with security, but security and trust are two
distinct concepts. Security in the virtual
world usually refers to enabling sheltered
communication between two entities. On
the other hand, we can imagine situations
where two interacting parties can resort to
unfair practices over a sheltered, secure com-
munication setup. Trust helps determine the
likelihood of detecting and preventing such
practices. As we’re all aware, trust between
two real-world parties tends to vary with
time, giving it a dynamic character. Similarly,
trust in the virtual world also has a dynamic
aspect, and this essay examines the manage-
ment of these dynamic aspects of trust.
Trust, trustworthiness, 
and trust ontology
When examining trust, we’re frequently
concerned with P2P systems because of
individual peers’ autonomy and the decen-
tralized nature of P2P communication.
Additionally, P2P communication might be
either anonymous or psuedononymous or
nonanonymous.3 Two important and related
concepts in such systems are trust and trust-
worthiness.4
We define trust as the trusting peer’s
belief in the trusted peer’s willingness and
capability to behave as expected by the
trusting peer in a given context at a given
time slot in a particular association rela-
tionship.3,4 The notions of belief, context,
time slot, willingness and capability, and as
expected by the trusting peer are very
important to this definition.
To characterize trust, we must have some
way to measure it.4 We define trustworthi-
ness as a measure that depicts the level of
trust that the trusting peer has in the trusted
peer in a given context at a given time slot
with a given type of association relation-
ship. Noting this, we can define a trust
ontology as 
Trust [trusting peer, trusted peer, context,
time slot start time, time slot end time,
association type, trustworthiness value]
The association relationship distinguishes
whether the trustworthiness measure is
between two individual peers, a peer and a
group of peers, two groups of peers, or within
a group of peers. Trustworthiness itself is
determined through
• Direct interaction between the trusting
and trusted peers using CCCI metrics4
• Use of the trusted peer’s reputation as
based on the opinion of witness peers
that have previously interacted with the
trusted peer
• Historical records of previous interactions
with the trusted peer
Reputation is widely used when the trust-
ing peer has had no previous interaction
with the trusted peer, just as we find in the
real world.
The dynamic nature of trust
As we noted earlier, as time passes, the
trust one entity has in another might not
stay the same and could change owing to
the following factors:
• After further dealings, the trusting
entity has a better idea of the trusted
entity’s capability and willingness to
act the way the trusting entity wants in
a given context.
• The trusted entity’s capability or willing-
ness to act in a given context the way the
trusting entity desires might change with
time.
• The trusting entity, after getting recom-
mendations from other entities, will
know more about the trusted entity’s
capability and willingness to act the way
that the trusting entity wants in a given
context.
We define the dynamic nature of trust as
the change in the trustworthiness value of
an entity, assigned to it by a given trusting
entity with the passage of time in different
time slots.
Because capability and willingness are
by and large not directly observable, we
must estimate them using peers’ external
factors from within the relationship charac-
teristics (see Table 1).
Managing trust dynamics
As we noted, reputation is one of the most
widely used mechanisms for computing
trustworthiness.5–8 However, given the
dynamic nature of trust with peers, we must
find a mechanism for predicting reputation
value in future time slots.
First, let’s define some terms necessary
for discussion. The repute value denotes an
entity’s reputation in a given context and at
a given time spot as communicated by a
witness entity. Trustworthiness prediction
is the process of determining the trusted
entity’s future trustworthiness value given
its past repute values. A trustworthiness
prediction’s time space is the total duration
of time over which the trusting entity will
analyze the trusted entity’s behavior and
process the trustworthiness prediction. The
time spot is the time at which an entity inter-
acted with another entity and subsequently
assigned it a trustworthiness value. A trust-
worthiness prediction’s time slot is the
breadth of time over which the reputation-
queried entity’s repute values are aggregated
into a single value for analyzing its dynamic
behavior. 
An entity will have a repute value for each
time slot, and the trusting entity will use these
values to predict the entity’s future trustwor-
thiness value.
We define the witness trustworthiness
value as a numeric value that denotes the cor-
rectness of the witness entity’s recommenda-
tions. Numerically, it’s the average of the
difference between the value the witness
entity communicates about the reputation-
queried entity and the trustworthiness value
that the reputation-querying entity found by
interacting with the reputation-queried entity.
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Table 1. The factors that define the dynamism of trust.
Factors Nature Specifiable, observable, and measurable?
Actual behavior, expected behavior Peers’ external factors Yes
Willingness, capability Peers’ internal factors No
Context, time, association type, Relationship factors Yes
initiation relationship
We use a trustworthiness scale [0, 6], in
which each numerical value denotes a level
of trust.4 We use the range [1, 2] to denote
negative trust, [3, 4] to denote neutral trust,
and [5, 6] to denote positive trust. We assign
the value of 0 to newcomers. When a new
entity joins the entity network and carries
out transactions with other entities, irrespec-
tive of whether its behavior in those trans-
actions was good or bad, the entity gets a
trustworthiness value greater than 0.4 So, it
has little motivation to drop the identity with
which its reputation is associated and come
back as a newcomer with a new identity. 
The range of witness trustworthiness
value in our proposed method, therefore, is
[–5, 5]. We assume that a witness entity
with a repute value in the [–1, 1] range is
communicating accurate recommendations.
A repute value in the [–1, 1] range occurs
because the difference between the two fac-
tors that determine the witness trustworthi-
ness value of an entity is at most one level
of trustworthiness. 
We consider three scenarios in which the
trusting entity must decide whether to inter-
act with another entity.
Case 1
The trusting entity must make a trust deci-
sion within the current time slot N and knows
the trusted entity’s trustworthiness value in
that time slot.
The trusting entity determines if it previ-
ously interacted with the trusted entity. If it
has, and if the time spot of previous inter-
action and the time at which it must make
its trust-based decision fall in the same time
slot (the last time slot N), then it doesn’t need
to issue a reputation query for the trusted
entity. It uses the value that it holds to make
a trust-based decision. 
Case 2
The trusting entity must make a trust deci-
sion within the current time slot N and does-
n’t know about the trusted entity’s trustwor-
thiness value in that time slot.
In this case, the trusting entity must issue a
reputation query for the prospective trusted
entity and specify the context in which it
wants to interact with the other entity, along
with the time space.
The reputation-querying entity first clas-
sifies the obtained reputation into the differ-
ent time slots using the time spot when the
interaction took place. It uses the witness
entities’ trustworthiness values to weed out
reputation from the untrusted entities. It
then combines the reputation obtained from
trustworthy and unknown entities using the
following expression to determine the repu-
tation-queried entity’s trustworthiness at
each time slot:
(1)
where N and M are the number of trusted and
number of unknown entities, respectively,
in time slot TA, A denotes the context, TA
denotes the time slot on the time space, T
denotes the time spot that the reputation-
querying peer finds in time slot TA, and m
denotes the identity of the reputation-queried
peer. Repute value [m, i, A, t] is the trustwor-
thiness value that witness entity i commu-
nicates about the reputation-queried entity
m at time spot t, in context A. WTV[i] rep-
resents the witness i’s trustworthiness value
as perceived by the reputation-querying peer
in the context of communicating recommen-
dations. is an operator that adjusts the
trustworthiness value communicated by the
witness entity with the witness entity’s wit-
ness trustworthiness value. β gives an appro-
priate weighting to the recommendations
that the unknown entities communicated.
The first term in Equation 1 combines
the reputation-queried entity’s reputation
values with the trusted entity’s reputation
values (the reputation-querying entity
trusts the trusted entity to communicate
accurate recommendations). The second
term combines the reputation values from
the unknown peers (with whom the reputa-
tion-querying entity has no previous expe-
rience soliciting recommendations).
Case 3
The trusting entity has to make a trust-
worthiness prediction for the trustworthi-
ness value at the time slot N + 1. In this
case, the trusting entity must model the
dynamic nature of trust while predicting
the trustworthiness value at the time slot 
N + 1.
If the trust-based decision falls at a time
in the future, then the trusting entity must
use the Markov method. It adopts the pro-
cedure we just explained to gather the repu-
tation-queried entity’s repute values and
subsequently weeds them out for each time
slot from 0 to N.
We define a reputation Markov chain as
a given entity’s sequence of aggregated
repute values that correspond to a sequence
of time slots. We can use Equation 1 to
obtain the Markov chain for an entity for a
sequence of time slots from 0 to N.
Then, the trusting entity must construct
the current state vector c and the Markov
matrix M to make a trustworthiness predic-
tion for the next time slot N + 1 using the
Markov model.
Constructing current state vector c. The
current state vector shows the reputation-
queried entity’s repute value at time slot N.
It will be a 1 × 6 matrix because we use six
trustworthiness levels. We determine the
reputation queried entity’s repute value at
time slot N using Equation 1, denoting it
with a 1 in the column corresponding to the
repute value at time slot N. We denote all
other trustworthiness levels with 0.
Constructing the Markov matrix. A given
entity’s Markov matrix denotes the proba-
bility of its transiting from one trustworthi-
ness level to another on the basis of its past
behavior, which we capture using the Markov
chain. To determine the probability of an
entity transiting from trustworthiness Level
1 to trustworthiness Level 2, we find the ratio
between the number of times that entity has
transited from Level 1 to Level 2 and the
total number of times the entity has transited
from Level 1 to any other level. We denote
an entity’s Markov matrix as M. This would
be a 6 × 6 matrix with rows corresponding
to the trustworthiness level at time slot N
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We can define a trust ontology as
Trust [trusting peer, trusted peer,
context, time slot start time, time
slot end time, association type,
trustworthiness value]
thiness level at time slot N + 1 of a given
entity. An element in the matrix denotes the
probability of the entity transiting from the
trustworthiness level corresponding to the
row in which the element occurs at time
slot N to the column in which the element
occurs, at time slot N + 1.
Determining the future trustworthiness
value at time slot N + 1. Once we determine
the Markov matrix and the current state, we
determine the entity’s future trust state vec-
tor by multiplying the current state vector
with the Markov matrix. The future state
vector denotes the probability that the entity
will behave with a trustworthiness level I at
time slot N + 1. We denote an entity’s future
state vector as f. Mathematically, we repre-
sent this as
f = c × M. (2)
From the future state vector, we choose
the reputation-queried entity’s future trust-
worthiness level (at time slot N + 1) as the
level to which the entity has the highest
probability of transiting. A trusting entity
decides to go ahead and interact with the
trusted entity only if the trusted entity’s trust-
worthiness level is ≥ 5 because 5 and 6
denote positive trust. This is the same for all
three cases we’ve described.
After interacting with the chosen entity,
the trusting entity uses CCCI metrics4 to
rate the trusted entity’s behavior in the inter-
action. On the basis of the trustworthiness
value assigned to the trusted entity after
interacting, it, the trusting entity modifies all
the witness entities’ witness trustworthiness
values, from which it had solicited recom-
mendations using the following:
(3)
where witness trustworthiness value (i) is
the trustworthiness of witness entity i in the
context of communicating recommendations,
Xi is the trustworthiness value that witness
entity i communicates about the prospec-
tive trusted entity, Ui is the trust value that
the trusting entity found when it interacted
with the trusted entity, Θ and β are weights
that give more importance to recent experi-
ence that an entity has with a given witness
entity in soliciting recommendations than
to old experiences. In general, Θ >> β and
Θ + β = 1. The weights Θ and β ensure that
old reputation matches receive less impor-
tance or no importance (β = 0) in determin-
ing a witness entity’s repute value.
Discussion and experimental
results
We carried out experiments to validate
our approach using the Jena multiagent
system. We took 128 agents for simulation
and bootstrapped the system to the same
level as previous researchers.6–10 The popu-
lation of malicious agents was 10 percent
of the total agent population. We took four
agents whose trustworthiness values were
Level 6 as trusting entities. We prompted a
trusting entity chosen randomly from the
four agents to carry out a transaction. Our
simulation results show that 100 percent of
the transactions that the trusting entities
carried out were correct in this experiment.
This represents an improvement over previ-
ously reported results.6–10
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Protecting Sensitive Data in
Peer-to-Peer Networks
Wolfgang Nejdl and Daniel Olmedilla,
L3S Research Center and University of
Hanover, Germany
Peer-to-peer data and services sharing has
become popular in recent years. Approaches
such as Edutella1 and Piazza2 have started
to extend these ideas toward decentralized
infrastructures for general information-
sharing purposes, which are most suitable
for sharing data and services on the Seman-
tic Web. These P2P networks’ most impor-
tant and intriguing characteristic is their
dynamic nature: peers can join and leave
the network as they like, and the underly-
ing infrastructure is responsible for making
peers’ data and services available as long as
they’re part of the network.
While one interesting question is “How do
we efficiently find data in a P2P network?”
another is “How do we protect data in a P2P
network?” This question becomes relevant as
soon as the P2P infrastructure manages not
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Our simulation results show that
100 percent of the transactions
that the trusting entities 
carried out were correct in this
experiment.
only freely available data but also data meant
to be accessible to only some users. Consider
the following scenario, which we’ve inves-
tigated in the context of the EU/IST-funded
ELENA project (www.elena-project.org).
ELENA aims to provide personalized and
decentralized infrastructures and brokerage
platforms for e-learning.
Suppose that E-Learn Associates manages
a Spanish course in the P2P-based ELENA
network, and Alice wishes to take the course.
E-Learn doesn’t offer its courses for free, so
Alice must use her credit card to charge the
price of the course. In addition, E-Learn has
an agreement with Hanover University and
offers a discount to all the employees work-
ing there. Alice works at Hanover University,
and she doesn’t mind showing her employee
ID to anyone. However, she doesn’t feel
comfortable showing her credit card to just
anyone—she is only willing to show her
credit card to companies that belong to the
Better Business Bureau Online Organization. 
To handle this problem, we need digital
credentials, access control policies, and the
ability to express trust negotiation between
peers.3 To see an appropriate subset of Alice’s
digital credentials, E-Learn must show that it
satisfies the access control policies for each
of them. In the process of demonstrating that
it satisfies those policies, it might have to dis-
close additional credentials of its own, but
only after Alice demonstrates that she satis-
fies the access control policies for each of
those additional credentials, and so on, result-
ing in an iterative trust negotiation process
between Alice and E-Learn.
The PeerTrust project
The PeerTrust project4,5 is investigating
trust negotiation in Semantic Web and P2P
environments. Within the program, digital
credentials can be signed XML or RDF
statements that express peer properties, and
policies are expressed as logic programs
that tie resource access to required creden-
tials. The ability to refer to peers, to cre-
dentials, or to other resources in PeerTrust
logic programs lets us express the iterative
exchange of credentials during a trust nego-
tiation process.
For our example, the PeerTrust policies
governing the negotiation between E-Learn
and Alice appear in Figure 1. An example
of the interaction diagram between them is
shown in Figure 2. Readers interested in
experimenting with PeerTrust should see
the sidebar “The PeerTrust Prototype.”
As Figure 3 shows, Alice and E-Learn
obtain trust negotiation software signed
by a source that they trust (PeerTrust Inc.)
and distributed either as a Java application
or an applet. After Alice requests the Span-
ish course from E-Learn’s Web front end,
she enters into a trust negotiation with E-
Learn’s negotiation server. The negotia-
tion servers can also act as servers for
the resources they protect (the learning
management servers), or they can be sepa-
rate entities, as in our figure. Additional
parties can participate in the negotiation,
if necessary (the Institution A and Insti-
tution B servers in Figure 3). If Alice is
granted access to the course, E-Learn sets
up a temporary account for her at the course
provider’s site and transparently redirects
her original request there. The temporary
account is invisible to Alice.
Logic programs as policy
languages
Logic programs are an obvious substrate
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E-Learn:
accessCourse(Course_Name) $ Requester ←
price(Course_Name, Price),
appliedDiscount(Course_Name, Requester, Price, FinalPrice),
creditCard(Requester, Number, ExpDate) @ Issuer @ Requester,
acceptedCreditCardIssuer(Issuer),
amountAvailable(FinalPrice, Requester, Number, ExpDate) @ Issuer.
appliedDiscount(“Spanish Course”, Requester, Price, FinalPrice) ←
employeeId(Requester) @ “Hanover University” @ Requester,
FinalPrice = 0.8 * Price.




member(“E-Learn”) @ “Better Business Bureau”
signedBy[“Better Business Bureau”].
Alice:
employeeId(“Alice Smith”) @ “Hanover University”
signedBy [“Hanover University”].
creditCard(“Alice Smith”, 12345678, “02/05”) @ “VISA” $ Requester ←
member(Requester) @ “Better Business Bureau” @ Requester.
Figure 1. The PeerTrust policies governing the negotiation between E-Learn and Alice.
Alice Smith E-Learn
accessCourse(“Spanish Course”)
employeeId(“Alice Smith”) @ “Hanover University“?
creditCard(“Alice Smith”,Number,ExpDate) @ Issuer?
<employeeId(“Alice Smith”) @ “Hanover University“>
access granted
member(“E-Learn“) @ “Better Business Bureau?”
<member(“E-Learn”) @ ”Better Business Bureau”>
<creditCard(“Alice Smith”, 12345678.'02/05”) @ “VISA”>
Figure 2. Negotiation between Alice and E-Learn.
for declarative, universally comprehensible
policy languages. In fact, recent efforts to
develop policy languages suitable for use in
trust negotiation have all chosen logic pro-
gramming as a substrate: SD3,6 RT,7 Cassan-
dra,8 and Piero Bonatti and Pierangela Sama-
rati’s approach9 demonstrate an emerging
consensus that constraint logic programs are
a promising choice. 
SD3 is a trust-management system that
uses an extension of Datalog as its policy
language. Its certificate retrieval system
provides the possibility of querying remote
systems given their IP addresses. In addi-
tion, it creates a proof that validates that the
answer is correct. The RT framework is a
set of languages for representing policies
and credentials where attributes are repre-
sented as roles. Starting with the most basic
language, called RT0, each new one provides
extra features. Cassandra is also a role-based
trust management system. It uses a policy
language based on Datalog with constraints,
and its expressiveness can be adjusted by
changing the constraint domain. It permits
the specification of permissions, delegation
of authority, revocation, and access control.
Bonatti and Samarati describe an approach
for specifying information disclosure con-
straints and the inference process necessary
to reason over them and filter relevant poli-
cies given a request. PeerTrust provides most
of the features that the previous systems
include, such as query facilities, a Datalog-
based policy language, trust negotiation
capabilities, and delegation of authority.
Additionally, the PeerTrust language adds
private and signed rules and references to
issuers and requesters, allowing more expres-
sive policies. PeerTrust also adds the possibil-
ity of nesting remote credential requests and
disclosures and, like the SD3 system, gener-
ates a proof with each answer that validates it.
For further reading, we encourage you
take a look at the Working Group I2 (on pol-
icy language, enforcement, and composition)
that the EU/IST FP6 Network of Excellence
REWERSE has established (http://rewerse.net)
and the TrustBuilder homepage (http://dais.
cs.uiuc.edu/trustbuilder/index.html). You
can also participate in the forthcoming
Workshop on Trust, Security, and Reputa-
tion on the Semantic Web at the 2004 Inter-
national Semantic Web Conference (http://
trust.mindswap.org/trustWorkshop).
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Figure 3. Resource access control scenario.
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Trust, but Verify:
Emergence, Trust, and Quality
in Intelligent Systems
Vipul Kashyap, Clinical Informatics R&D,
Partners Healthcare System
Trust, but verify—the late Ronald Reagan
(US president, 1980–88) enunciated this
well-known political dictum in his attempts
to break down barriers and integrate com-
munist systems (political, economic, and
nuclear) into a capitalist world. This dictum is
equally appropriate in the context of informa-
tion integration and service composition for
creating and deploying intelligent systems.
Biomedical information and research is a
representative domain that presents com-
plex and interesting challenges. It’s also a




Biomedical and biological research has
grown from a cottage industry marked by
scarce, expensive, manually generated data
to a large-scale, data-rich industry marked
by factory-scale sequencing. Biomedicine
is fast becoming an information-based sci-
ence, with data and information playing 
a big role across the research flow (for
example, genomics → transcriptomics →
proteomics → metabolomics → final prod-
ucts and results). Scientific-data integration
is one of the most daunting challenges at
the interface between computer science and
biology1 and has been seen as restraining
rapid progress in biomedical research (see
http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/bioinformatics/
index.asp. Biomedical data integration poses
a unique set of challenges:1–3
• Diversity of information objects, includ-
ing data types and queries: sequences,
complex phenotypic and disease-relevant
data, graphs, 3D structures, and images;
and similarity-based queries (for example,
sequence similarity), classification-based
queries (for example, papers about gene
X), and what-if hypotheses-generating
queries (what if gene X was suppressed—
will protein Z exist?)
• Diversity of information-based computa-
tions and operations: experimental plans
and protocols using complex repetitive
computations involving data retrieval,
fusion, and analytics; data curation and
annotation tasks; and hypothesis valida-
tion across multiple requiring scenarios
and federated search-query processing
• Semantic heterogeneity: multiple con-
trolled vocabularies and ontologies requir-
ing integration, interoperation, and compo-
sition; and semiautomatic creation and
verification of mappings, including com-
plex mappings across vocabularies and
ontologies; and mappings and annotations
of data objects to ontological concepts
• Biomedical research’s dynamic and
evolving nature: evolution of schemas,
ontologies, and vocabularies and their
impact on underlying mappings or anno-
tations; evolution of data objects and
their impact on associated mapping and
annotations; data uncertainty and incon-
sistency; and support for proactive data
mining and hypothesis generation
The Semantic Web effort4 attempts to
address some of these problems by explic-
itly capturing the semantics of information
and services in a machine-readable format
(see www.w3.org/RDF and www.w3.org/
TR/owl-features). Meanwhile, over and
above the scale of the data and information
explosion, semantics itself is a moving tar-
get that keeps evolving with time and use.
This calls into question the formal top-down
and classical logic-based approaches various
Semantic Web researchers are proposing.
An alternative and potentially better-suited
approach that’s bottom-up and statistical in
nature investigates the phenomena of emer-
gence in the context of information and ser-
vice semantics.3,5–8 (This proposition itself
is worthy of debate but isn’t the focus of
this essay.)
The critical question that arises is, how
do we guide this process? That is, how do
we ensure that the emergent processes
don’t generate spurious and flawed infor-
mation? As the emergent semantics process
flow (which I discuss later) goes through
multiple iterations, it generates various arti-
facts (taxonomies, ontologies, mappings,
and so on). The quality of the data and
information these artifacts represent can
help guide these emergent processes. How-
ever, early on the process will probably be
in a bootstrapping mode, so you need an a
priori measure of information quality. I’d
argue here that an a priori trust in the arti-
fact component or source is the only way
this is possible. However, as the system cre-
ates and evolves more semantics, we must
modulate this a priori measure with some-
thing that measures the generated artifacts’
internal consistency and validity. That is, we
must verify the a priori measures—hence




An emergent semantics-based informa-
tion infrastructure,3 which Figure 4 shows,
would be a proactive platform where peo-
ple and applications could collaborate to
create dynamic semantics reflecting the
current state of knowledge in biomedical
research. This infrastructure would have
some interesting properties:
• Self-description. The infrastructure would
enable self-description of biological data
and content. This is the focus of XML-
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based markup languages—for example,
BioPAX (www.biopax.org) and OWL—
and ontologies or vocabularies—for exam-
ple, GeneOntology (www.geneontology.
org) and the Unified Medical Language
System Semantic Network.9
• Self-genesis. The infrastructure would
proactively analyze data and content
flowing through it to create models,
ontologies, and concepts to capture
semantics, enabling bootstrapping of
prevalent meanings.
• Autoemergence. The infrastructure would
monitor interactions between people and
applications to capture and describe new
meanings and knowledge that emerge, or
existing meanings and knowledge that
evolve from these interactions. This prop-
erty might enable proactive generation of
new biomedical hypotheses on the basis
of new emerging knowledge.
• Self-organization. The infrastructure
would (re)organize itself to perform new
tasks in response to new requests for
information and services or due to new
meanings emerging. Two types of self-
organization are self-interoperation or
integration, and self-provisioning. With
the former, the infrastructure would inte-
grate or interoperate between existing
meanings in response to new requests for
information and services. This might
lead to creating data annotations or map-
pings between concepts in ontologies.
With the latter, the infrastructure would
monitor data retrieval and computation
operations invoked and proactively cre-
ate experimental plans, workflows, pro-
tocols, and models. 
Emergence, information
quality, and trust
We can classify the collection of artifacts
or components that the emergent semantics
process generates (see Figure 4) under two
broad categories: source components present
at the beginning of the process and derived
artifacts generated during the process.
Source components include data and content
sources and subject matter experts (SMEs).
Derived artifacts include domain ontologies,
both single and composed; annotations and
mappings; hypotheses; and experiments,
models, and plans.
The generated artifacts must be of good
quality. “Quality” might refer to both the
information and data quality of domain
ontologies, annotations, mappings, and data
sources and the quality of service related to
software components that you might develop
to realize various plans, experiments, and so
on. Quality metrics for the artifacts I just
discussed fall into two broad categories:
• Intracomponent or artifact quality mea-
sures, including those that evaluate qual-
ity on the basis of some internal consis-
tency criteria and those assigned a priori
to an artifact
• Intercomponent quality measures, includ-
ing those that come from quality measures
assigned to other related components
In the initial bootstrapping stages, where
little information is available about the vari-
ous components, we must depend on a pri-
ori quality measures. Furthermore, trust met-
rics are highly correlated with these quality
measures, at least initially. Finally, over time,
we should adjust quality metrics to consis-
tently reflect external components’ quality
measures. Trust, but verify. 
Colleagues and I at the Dagstuhl Work-
shop on Data Quality discussed one possible
approach for generating a joint measure or
metric to reflect this interrelationship.10 We
propose pragmatic and workable definitions
(and not philosophical ones) for the notion
of trust and other concepts it depends on.
Figure 5 shows a proposed taxonomy and
definition flow chart. Verifying the data and
information captured in an artifact or con-
sumed or produced by the service a compo-
nent provides forms the organizing princi-
ple of the taxonomy in Figure 5. We can
organize various notions of trust around this
notion of verifiability.
Fact
If we can verify data or information by
some means, it’s a fact. Verifiability might be
based on either established theories (3 + 2 = 5)
or on trust in an authority (the US Govern-
ment Web site currently states that George
W. Bush is the US president). If we can’t
verify the information stored in the data by
some means, we must have belief in that
piece of information. 
Belief
When we assume that some piece of data
or information or a service’s quality is valid
































Figure 4. A strawman emergent semantics infrastructure and process.
In the initial bootstrapping stages,
where little information is
available about the various
components, we must depend on a
priori quality measures. 
without objective verification or recourse
to a trusted authority, it’s a belief. Accord-
ing to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictio-
nary, belief is “a state or habit of mind in
which trust or confidence is placed in some
person or thing,” a notion intimately con-
nected to trust.
A priori belief
When you assume the validity of some
data or information in an a priori manner,
without an underlying rationale (bordering
on faith), it’s an a priori belief. This notion
appears biblical, but if we analyze how intel-
ligent systems are used or deployed we might
find that it’s used quite often in this field.
Rational belief
When we assume some data or informa-
tion’s validity on the basis of some rationale
or justification, it’s a rational belief. An
example is an intelligent system’s reputa-
tion, which is based on past experiences
with the system. (In the emergent semantics
process flow in Figure 4, reputation-based
belief is relevant in the context of SMEs, a
component in the process flow.) We might
measure these past experiences objectively
and empirically. For instance, we might use
measures such as consistency, completeness,
or quality of service typically used in the
data quality literature to characterize past
results received from an information system.
Trust
The notion of trust is based on the con-
tinuum of belief notions I just defined. So,
we might have a priori trust in some infor-
mation, data, or service. This a priori trust
could be useful in the initial bootstrapping
stages of the  emergent semantic process flow
and could be modulated with more objective
measures such as consistency, complete-
ness, and quality of service. Finally, trust
could either be direct (I trust this informa-
tion) or indirect or transitive (I trust this
information because my friends trust it).11
In the latter case, we can assume that trust
decays in proportion to the length of the
“trust chain.”
The trust-quality metric
We can view the trust-quality metric as a
multidimensional measure. One set of dimen-
sions could describe objective (or verifiable)
measures, and another could comprise sub-
jective (or a priori) measures. We could com-
bine dimensions in two ways.
Multidimensional comparison
We might prioritize the dimensions,
according a higher priority to the objective
ones. So, a comparison function could first
choose to compare the objective dimensions.
In a case where the comparison function
based on the objective dimensions returns
values that are equal or within a statistical
error range, we could then compare the
subjective dimensions.
Composition into a single measure
The other approach is to combine the
dimensions’ values into a single common
measure by assigning weights to the vari-
ous dimensions. For instance, we could
combine a subjective measure such as a pri-
ori belief and an objective measure such as
reputation as
Quality = α × AprioriBelief + β ×
Reputation
The weights might reflect application
requirements. For instance, in the absence
of any other information, we might want to
set α = 1, β = 0. Furthermore, a priori belief
itself might have varying levels of subjec-
tivity, and reputation might be characteriz-
able in terms of information or data quality
factors, such as consistency and complete-
ness, or quality-of-service factors:
Quality = α1 × DirectTrust + α2 ×
IndirectTrust + β1 × Consistency + β2 ×
Completeness + β3 × QualityOfService
Of course, we must do more experiments
to refine these empirical equations and
understand the true nature of the interrela-
tionship between trust and quality. Till then,
we’ll have to trust, but verify!
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